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Evaluating the impacts of the EU-ETS on prices,
investments and profits of the Italian electricity market∗
Francesca Bonenti† Giorgia Oggioni‡ Elisabetta Allevi§ Giacomo Marangoni¶
December 20, 2011

Abstract
In this paper we investigate the economic impacts of the European Emission Trading Scheme
(EU-ETS) on the Italian electricity market by a power generation expansion model. In particular, we assume that generators make their capacity expansion decisions in a Cournot or in a
perfect competition manner. This model is used to measure the effects of the EU-ETS Directives
on electricity prices and demand, investments and generators’ profits both in an oligopolistic
and in a perfectly competitive organization of the power market.
We adopt a technological representation of the energy market which is discretized into six geographical zones (North, Center-North, Center-South, South, Sicily, Sardinia) and five virtual
poles (Monfalcone, Foggia, Brindisi, Rossano, Priolo) with limited production for a total of
eleven zones. We assume that generators operate in different zones connected by interconnections with limited capacity and produce energy by running existing or new plants in which they
directly invest.
We consider several investment scenarios under the CO2 regulation with and without incentives to renewables. The scenarios also include simulations on future effects of the third EU-ETS
phase on the system.
Our analysis shows that perfect competition induces generators to invest more than in an
oligopolistic framework, but in both market configurations, investments are mainly concentrated in fossil-fired plants (CCGT and coal), leaving a small proportion to new wind plants.
This happens also in presence of incentives given to renewable technologies. We can thus conclude that investments in a secure and efficient technology like CCGT is preferable compared
to those in renewables that cannot be used with continuity. This investment policy affects
electricity prices that significantly increase in 2020 compared to their 2009 levels. The raise of
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electricity prices in 2020 is particularly favorable for generators operating as Cournot players
which are able to increase their profits compared to 2009, despite the full auctioning system
foreseen for the allocation of CO2 allowance to the power sector in the third EU-ETS phase.
The solution of the overall system is found by exploiting the mixed complementarity theoretical framework and solution algorithms. The developed model is implemented as complementarity problems and solved in GAMS using the PATH solver.
Keywords: Complementarity conditions, General equilibrium models, EU-ETS, Italian
electricity market.
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1

Introduction

In the last twenty years, the restructuring process of the electricity system has deeply changed
the organization of this market around the world. In Europe, following the examples of United
Kingdom and Norway, the European Commission issued the Directive 96/92/EC in order to
liberalize the power sector and create an Internal Electricity Market (IEM). This Directive
imposed the unbundling of generation, transmission and distribution that, since then, were
vertically integrated and controlled by a sole entity (power company) operating in a monopolistic
regime. The aim of this Directive was to improve efficiency and avoid abuses of dominant
positions, especially in setting power prices.
In Italy, the disposals of the European Directive 96/92/EC were acknowledged by the Bersani
decree in 1999, but only in 2004 the Power Exchange GME (“Gestore del Mercato Elettrico”)
became operative on the Italian energy market (IPEX). With the Bersani decree, the old monopolist Enel had to disinvest 15 GW of its production capacity in order to reduce its market
share. The current Enel’s contribute to the Italian power production is of 28,1%, significantly
lower than its 2004 level of 43,9%1 . However, the Italian market cannot be yet considered fully
competitive as highlighted by Floro (2009).
Since 2005, the energy sector is involved in the European Emission Trading Scheme (EUETS)2 . The EU-ETS is an environmental policy developed in the framework of the Kyoto Protocol that aims at reducing the European CO2 emissions generated by carbon-intensive installations of the energy and industrial sectors. Such a goal is achieved through the implementation
of a cap-and-trade system that imposes a CO2 emission limit to all covered installations and
creates a market that prices CO2 where ETS participants can exchange their emission permits.
The EU-ETS was initially subdivided into two phases as indicated by Directive 2003/87/EC.
The first phase (2005-2007), the so-called “learning by doing phase”, was introduced to test the
functioning of the EU-ETS system. Its implementation led to some economic distortions mainly
due to the grandfathering of the emission allowances (Neuhoff et al., 2006a, 2006b; Reinaud,
2003, 2005) and to the consequent raise of “windfall profits” for the power sector (Sijm et al.,
2006). Compared to the energy intensive industries involved in the EU-ETS, generators are able
to pass through a high proportion of their carbon costs in electricity prices despite the fact that
almost all CO2 permits, needed to cover their emissions, are freely distributed. This happens
because the current organization of electricity markets allows for pricing power at marginal
production cost. The result is twofold: the EU-ETS causes both an increase of electricity prices
and an intended raise of generators’ profits. These two issues have been extensively discussed
in literature and many studies confirm this outcome (see, for instance, Chen et al., 2008, Kara
et al., 2008, Linares et al., 2008 and Lise et al., 2010, Oggioni and Smeers, 2009).
In order to remedy to this situation, the Directive 2009/29/EC, regulating the third EU-ETS
phase (2013-2020), has imposed a full auctioning system for the allocation of emission permits
destined to the energy sector. For the industrial sectors, it foresees a progressive adoption of
the auctioning system starting from a proportion of the 20% in 2013 and reaching a 70% level in
1

See Autorità per l’Energia Elettrica e il Gas (AEEG), Relazione annuale sullo stato dei servizi e sull’attività
svolta, 2011. Available at http://www.autorita.energia.it/it/relaz_ann/11/11.htm
2
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/index_en.htm
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20203 . Moreover, the revised EU-ETS will cover more industries and types of greenhouse gases
and will encourage the development of renewables.
In this paper, we investigate the economic impacts of the EU-ETS on the Italian electricity
market. In particular, taking into account the current organization of the Italian electricity
market, we formulate a capacity expansion model, where generators are Cournot players. Indeed,
imperfect competition models are often used to study electricity markets (see, for instance, Chen
and Hobbs, 2005, Chen et al., 2006, Hobbs, 2001, Hobbs and Helman, 2004, Vespucci et al.,
2009). An oligopolistic market can be described either by a Nash-Cournot or a Bertrand or a
Supply Function Equilibrium models. Supply Function Equilibrium (see Anderson and Hu, 2008,
Willems et al., 2009) and Cournot Equlibrium (for overviews see Tirole, 1988, Vives, 1999 and
for review see Ventosa et al., 2005) are the most applied models to electricity markets. However,
since the aim of the restructuring of the electricity market is to make it fully competitive, we
also analyze the case where power producers operate in a perfectly competitive market. More
specifically, we adopt a technological representation of the energy market and we assume that
generators operate in different zones linked by inter-connectors with limited transfer capacity.
The solution of the overall system is found by exploiting the mixed complementarity theoretical
framework and solution algorithms.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we describe the market model
where generators are Cournot competitors. Section 3 presents a perfectly competitive version
of the model illustrated in Section 2. In Section 4 we discuss the results of our analysis. Finally,
Section 5 is devoted to conclusions and final remarks.

2

The market model

We first describe a market where generators compete à la Cournot. Each generator maximizes
its profits taking into account the decision taken by his competitors. Market energy balance
is guaranteed by the Italian Market Operator which maximizes consumers’ willingness to pay
taking into account the transfer limits of the interconnections linking the different zones. We
also model an emission market limited to the energy sector. We first list the notation used in
this paper.

2.1

Notation

We here introduce all symbols of the model. They are classified on basis of their means and use.
Sets
• i ∈ I: Zones;
• t ∈ T : Time segment, we consider time horizon t = 1, ..., 24 hours;
• p ∈ P : Set of technologies (note that we respectively indicate with p = h and p = sh the
hydro plants based on reservoir and on the pumped-storage technologies);
3

The Article 10 ter of the Directive 2009/29/EC states that all industrial sectors that are exposed to the risk
of carbon leakage will continue to receive free permits. See http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/leakage/
index_en.htm.
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• f ∈ F : Generators;
Parameters
• vcf,p,i : Hourly variable costs of new and existing plant of technology type p owned by
generator f in zone i (e/MWh);
• f cf,p,i : Hourly fixed costs of new plant of technology type p owned by generator f in zone
i (e/MWh);
• shcf,sh,i : Hourly costs of pumped-storage technology sh when pumping owned by generator f in zone i (e/MWh);
• Gf,p,i : Total available capacity of technology plant p owned by generator f in zone i
(MW);
• T H f,p,i : Total available capacity of hydro p = h, sh technology owned by generator f in
zone i (MW);
• ghh , ghh : Minimum and maximum capacity of hydro technology h (MW) owned by generator f in zone i;
• shf,sh,i , shf,sh,i : Minimum and maximum capacity of the technology pumping water in
the upper basin in the pumped-storage technology sh (MW);
• gshf,sh,i , gshf,sh,i : Minimum and maximum capacity of pumped-storage technology sh
(MW) owned by generator f in zone i;
• Rf,p,i : Variance between maximum and minimum energy reserve of hydro technology h
and sh (MW) owned by company f in zone i;
• ep : Emission factor of technology p (ton/MWh);
• E: Total emission cap (ton);
• GEf : Total amount of emission allowances grandfathered to generators f (ton);
• τ : 8760 (number of hours in one year);
• τt : 365 (number of days in one year);
• at,i : Intercept of consumers’ affine demand functions at zone i in time segment t (e/MWh);
• bt,i : Slope of consumers’ affine demand functions at zone i in time segment t (e/MWh2 );
• ρf,sh,i : Performance of pumped-storage technology showned by generator f in zone i.
• F lowi,ii : Flow transfer limit from zone i to zone ii (MW).
Variables
• gt,f,p,i : Power produced by generators f in zone i using existing technology p in time
segment t (MWh) (In particular, gt,f,h,i : power supplied by generators f in zone i using
existing technology h in time segment t (MWh), gt,f,sh,i : power supplied by generators f
in zone i using existing technology sh in time segment t (MWh).);
• gnt,f,p,i : Power produced by generators f to zone i using new technology p in time segment
t (MWh);
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• sht,f,sh,i : Power used by generator f in zone i to pump water in the upper reservoir of
pumped-storage technology sh in time segment t (MWh);
• Rt,f,h,i : Hydro energy reserve of hydro technology h owned by generator f in zone i in
time segment t (MWh);
• If,p,i : Investments in new capacity of technology type p operated by generators f in zone
i (MW);
• st,f,i : Power supplied by generator f to zone i in time segment t (MWh);
• dt,i : Electricity consumption in zone i in time segment t (MWh);
• pt,i : Nodal electricity price in time segment t (e/MWh);
• Pt,i (dt,i ): Willingness to pay in zone i and in time segment t (e);
• f lowt,i,ii : Power transferred from zone i to zone ii in time segment t.

2.2

Generation expansion model

We model a zonal market where generators compete as Cournot players. They produce energy by
running existing or new plants in which they invest. We assume that new plants are immediately
disposable. Each plant is characterized by its own fixed4 , emission and fuel costs that influence
their endogenously determined merit order. During the implementation phase, we consider a set
of eight technologies composed of wind, photovoltaic, geothermal, run-on-river, coal, CCGT, gas
and oil based technologies. These plants are endogenously put in merit order. In the theoretical
formulation of the problem, we also model the use of reservoir and pumped-storage hydro
plants5 . Generators make their strategical investment and production choices by taking into
account the environmental opportunity costs due to the CO2 regulation.
Each generator f maximizes its objective function (1) subject to technological constraints
P
(2)-(15). In (1), the term st,−f,i stands for f 0 6=f st,f 0 ,i . In particular, each generator maximizes
P
his profit (1) by selling electricity at price pt,i (st,−f,i + sf,t,i − ii (f lowt,i,ii − f lowt,ii,i ) that
in the following we denote as pt,i . The costs faced by generators are: the variable generation
P
P
( p,i vcf,p,i · (gt,f,p,i + gnt,f,p,i ) · τt ), the investment ( p,i f cf,p,i · If,p,i · τ ) and the emission
P
opportunity costs (ϕ·(GEf − t,p,i ep ·(gt,f,p,i + gnt,f,p,i ) · τ t )) computed over a year. Moreover,
for those generators who dispose of hydro pumped-storage technologies, we consider the cost of
P
pumping water from the lower to the upper basin ( i,t shcf,sh,i · sht,f,sh,i · τ t ).


"
!#
X

X
Max
pt,i st,−f,i + st,f,i −
(f lowt,i,ii − f lowt,ii,i )
· st,f,i · τt +
(1)


t,i

−

ii


X


vcf,p,i · (gt,f,p,i + gnt,f,p,i ) +

t,p,i

X

shcf,sh,i · sht,f,sh,i

t,i




· τt +



 



X
+ ϕ · GEf −
ep · (gt,f,p,i + gnt,f,p,i ) · τt +


t,p,i

4
5

We only account for fixed costs of new generating units.
Unfortunately, we do not dispose of the data related to these two hydro technologies.
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−

X

f cf,p,i · If,p,i · τ

p,i

s.t.
X

gt,f,p,i +

p

X

gnt,f,p,i = st,f,i

∀t, f, i

(αt,f,i )

(2)

p

Gf,p,i − gt,f,p,i ≥ 0

(βt,f,p,i ≥ 0)

If,p,i − gnt,f,p,i ≥ 0

T H f,p,i − gt,f,p,i − Rt,f,p,i ≥ 0

∀t, f, p 6= h, p 6= sh, i

(νt,f,p,i ≥ 0)

∀t, f, p, i

(βt,f,p=h,p=sh,i ≥ 0)

∀t, f, p = h, p = sh, i

(3)
(4)

(5)

Rt,f,p,i + Rf,p,i ≥ 0

(ξ t,f,p,i ≥ 0)

∀t, f, p = h, p = sh, i

(6)

Rf,p,i − Rt,f,p,i ≥ 0

(ξ t,f,p,i ≥ 0)

∀t, f, p = h, p = sh, i

(7)

gt,f,h,i − ghf,h,i ≥ 0

(δ t,f,h,i ≥ 0)

∀t, f, h, i

(8)

ghf,h,i − gt,f,h,i ≥ 0

(δ t,f,h,i ≥ 0)

∀t, f, h, i

(9)

ρf,sh,i · sht,f,sh,i − gt,f,sh,i ≥ 0

(ηt,f,sh,i ≥ 0)

∀t, f, sh, i

(10)

sht,f,sh,i − shf,sh,i ≥ 0

(θt,f,sh,i ≥ 0)

∀t, f, sh, i

(11)

shf,sh,i − sht,f,sh,i ≥ 0

(θt,f,sh,i ≥ 0)

∀t, f, sh, i

(12)

gt,f,sh,i − gshf,sh,i ≥ 0

(µt,f,sh,i ≥ 0)

∀t, f, sh, i

(13)

gshf,sh,i − gt,f,sh,i ≥ 0

(µt,f,sh,i ≥ 0)

∀t, f, sh, i

(14)

gt,f,p,i ; gnt,f,p,i ; It,f,p,i ; st,f,i ≥ 0

∀t, f, p, i

(15)

Equation (2) defines a production balance between the total amount of electricity generated
P
p gt,f,p,i +
p gnt,f,p,i ) and sold (st,f,i ) in zone i by generator f in each time segment t.
Constraints (3) and (4) impose generation capacity limits respectively for existing and new
plants. These constraints hold for all technologies with the exception of pumped storage and
hydro plants with reservoir. For these hydro technologies, we have specific capacity constraints
(see (5)-(14)). Constraint (5) states that the total available capacity T H f,p,i (with p = h, sh)
has to be greater or equal to the sum of the quantity of electricity gt,f,p,i (with p = h, sh)
generated by those hydro plants and the energy reserve Rt,f,p,i of the recervoir. This reserve
varies between a minimum (−Rf,p,i ) and a maximum (Rf,p,i ) level as indicated by constraints
(6) and (7). Conditions (8), (9), (13) and (14) indicate the generation limits of the turbines of
hydro (with reservoir) and pumped-storage technologies respectively.
Condition (10) defines that the energy needed to pump water from the lower to the upper
reservoir is greater than the energy produced. The turbine used to pump water has capacity
limits as indicated by inequalities (11) and (12) that respectively define a lower and an upper
bound.
Finally, conditions (15) are the non-negativity constraints.
(

P
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2.3

Market operator’s model

Market Operator maximizes the consumers’ willingness to pay (16) taking into account a zonal
energy balance constraint (17)-(18) and transmission constraint (19) that defines the flow transfer limits among connected zones (more details are reported in Section 4.1).
#
"
X Z dt,i
Maxdt,i
Pt,i (ξ)dξ · τt
(16)
0

t

s.t
X

st,f,i −

X
(f lowt,i,ii − f lowt,ii,i ) − dt,i = 0
dt,i ≥ 0

∀t, i

∀t, i

0 ≤ f lowt,i,ii ≤ F lowi,ii

2.4

(ψt,i )

(17)

ii

f

(σt,i,ii )

(18)
∀t, i, ii

(19)

Emission market

Our model only considers the emissions of power plants. Since National Allocation Plans (NAPs)
refer to annual targets, we impose one emission constraint, limited to the electricity market,
which is associated with the dual variable ϕ, representing the allowance price. E indicates
P
the annual CO2 emission cap while t,f,p,i ep · (gt,f,p,i + gnt,f,p,i ) · τt are the annual emissions
generated by electricity production.
E−

X

ep · ((gt,f,p,i + gnt,f,p,i ) · τt ) ≥ 0

(ϕ ≥ 0)

(20)

t,f,p,i

2.5

Mathematical structure

Let K be a nonempty, closed and convex subset of the n-dimensional Euclidean space Rn ,
F : K → Rn a continuous mapping. The variational inequality problem (VI for short) is the
problem of finding a point x∗ ∈ K such that
hF (x), (x − x∗ )i ≥ 0,

∀ x ∈ K.

(21)

The solution set of VI (21) is denoted by SOL(K, F ).
Most existence results of solutions for VIs are proved by using various fixed point theorems.
As shown by Hartmann & Stampacchia (1966), VI (21) has a solution if K is compact and
F is continuous.
In general, VI can have more than one solution. We now recall one condition under which
VI (21) has a unique solution, this result needs generalized monotonicity assumption.
Definition 1 Let K be a convex set in Rn . A mapping F : K ⊆ Rn → Rn is said to be
• monotone on K if (F (x) − F (y))T (x − y) > 0, ∀x, y ∈ K;
• strictly monotone on K if (F (x) − F (y))T (x − y) > 0, ∀x, y ∈ K and x 6= y.

8
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Theorem 1 (Harker & Pang 1990) If F (x) is strictly monotone then VI (21) has at most one
solution.
In addition, we now recall the known monotonicity criteria for continuosly differentiable
mappings.
Theorem 2 (Ortega & Rheinboldt, 1970) Let K be an open convex set in Rn and let F : K ⊆
Rn → Rn be countinuously differentiable on K.
• F is monotone on K if and only if ∇F is positive semidefinite on K;
• F is strictly monotone on K if ∇F is positive definite on K.
VIs are closely related with many problems of Nonlinear Analysis, such as complementarity,
fixed point and optimization problems. In general, a complementarity problem (CP) is the
problem of finding a point x such that:
0 ≤ x ⊥ F (x) ≥ 0

(22)

where F : Rn+ → Rn . We recall that condition (23) can be alternatively defined as:
x ≥ 0,

F (x) ≥ 0,

F (x) · x = 0.

(23)

We now consider a Nash Equilibrium problem with N players, each of whom has a certain
cost function θi (x), where x = (xi : i = 1, ..., N ), and a strategy set Ki ⊆ Rni .
The problem of player i, given the other players’ strategies x
ei = (xj : j 6= i), is to solve the cost
i
minimization problem in the variable y :
min θi (y i , xei )

(24)

i

sub to y ∈ Ki .
The solution set of the problem is denoted by Si (xei ).
Definition 2 A Nash Equilibrium is a tuple of strategies x = (xi : i = 1, ..., N ) such that for
each i, xi ∈ Si (xei ).
This problem can be transformed into an equivalent variational inequality or complementarity problem if for each fixed xei the θi (y i , xei ) function is convex in y i . The following proposition
gives the relationship between the solution of VI and the solution of a Nash Equilibrium (see
Facchinei and Pang, 2003).
Proposition 1 Let Ki be a close subset of Rni . Assume that for each fixed tuple xei , the function
θi (y i , xei ) is convex and continuously differentiable in y i .
Then x is a Nash equilibrium if and only if x ∈ SOL(K, F ), where
K := K1 × K2 × ... × KN ,
F (x) := (∇xi θi (x))

∇xi θi (x) =

i = 1, ..., N

and

∂θi (x)
∂θi (x)
,
...,
.
∂xi1
∂xiN

9
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It is easy to verify that our Cournot model presented in Section 2 can be formulated as a VI,
where each function θi (y i , xei ) is continuous and strictly convex in the variable y i .The resulting
function F (x) that defines the VI of our Cournot problem is continuous and it has a Jacobian
matrix positive definite on the bounded, convex and admissible set. Hence, on the basis of these
considerations, we can conclude that our model has one solution.
In order to find this solution, we formulate our model in complementarity form that we here
present.
0 ≤ vcf,p,i + ϕ · ep − αt,f,i + βt,f,p,i ⊥ gt,f,p,i ≥ 0

∀t, f, p, i

(25)

0 ≤ vcf,p,i + ϕ · ep − αt,f,i + νt,f,p,i ⊥ gnt,f,p,i ≥ 0

∀t, f, p, i

(26)

0 ≤ vcf,h,i + ϕ · eh − αt,f,i + βt,f,h,i − δ t,f,h,i +
+δ t,f,h,i ⊥ gt,f,h,i ≥ 0

(27)

∀t, f, h, i

0 ≤ vcf,sh,i + ϕ · esh − αt,f,i + βt,f,sh,i + ηt,f,sh,i
−µt,f,sh,i + µt,f,sh,i ⊥ gt,f,sh,i ≥ 0
0≤

∀t, f, sh, i

−∂pt,i
· st,f,i − pt,i + αt,f,i ⊥ sf,p,i ≥ 0
∂st,f,i

∀f, p, i

0 ≤ shcf,sh,i − ρf,sh,i · ηt,f,sh,i − θt,f,sh,i + θt,f,sh,i ⊥ sht,f,sh,i ≥ 0
0 ≤ f cf,p,i −

X τt
t

X
p

gt,f,p,i +

X

τ

νt,f,p,i ⊥ If,p,i ≥ 0

gnt,f,p,i − st,f,i = 0

(28)

(29)
∀t, f, sh, i

∀f, p, i

(30)
(31)

∀t, f, i

(32)

∀t, f, p 6= h, p 6= sh, i

(33)

(αt,f,i )

p

0 ≤ Gf,p,i − gt,f,p,i ⊥ βt,f,p,i ≥ 0

0 ≤ T H f,p,i − gt,f,p,i − Rt,f,p,i ⊥ γt,f,p,i ≥ 0

∀t, f, p = h, p = sh, i

(34)

0 ≤ gt,f,h,i − ghf,h,i ⊥ δ t,f,h,i ≥ 0

∀t, f, h, i

(35)

0 ≤ ghf,h,i − gt,f,h,i ⊥ δ t,f,h,i ≥ 0

∀t, f, h, i

(36)

0 ≤ Rt,f,p,i + Rf,p,i ⊥ ξ t,f,p,i ≥ 0

∀t, f, p = h, p = sh, i

(37)

0 ≤ Rf,p,i − Rt,f,p,i ⊥ ξ t,f,p,i ≥ 0

∀t, f, p = h, p = sh, i

(38)

0 ≤ ρf,sh,i · sht,f,sh,i − gt,f,sh,i ⊥ ηt,f,sh,i ≥ 0

∀t, f, sh, i

(39)

0 ≤ sht,f,sh,i − shf,sh,i ⊥ θt,f,sh,i ≥ 0

∀t, f, sh, i

(40)

0 ≤ shf,sh,i − sht,f,sh,i ⊥ θt,f,sh,i ≥ 0

∀t, f, sh, i

(41)

0 ≤ gt,f,sh,i − gshf,sh,i ⊥ µt,f,sh,i ≥ 0

∀t, f, sh, i

(42)

0 ≤ gshf,sh,i − gt,f,sh,i ⊥ µt,f,sh,i ≥ 0

∀t, f, sh, i

(43)

10

http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper650

10

Bonenti et al.: Evaluating the Impacts of the EU-ETS on Prices, Investments

0 ≤ If,p,i − gnt,f,p,i ⊥ νt,f,p,i ≥ 0
βt,f,h,i − ξ t,f,h,i + ξ t,f,h,i = 0

∀t, f, p, i

(44)

∀t, f, h, i

(Rt,f,h,i )

(45)

The complementarity conditions associated to the market operator’ problem are as follows:
0 ≤ −at,i + bt,i · dt,i + ψt,i ⊥ dt,i ≥ 0
X
X
st,f,i −
(f lowt,i,ii − f lowt,ii,i ) − dt,i = 0

∀t, i
(ψt,i )

(46)
∀t, i

(47)

ii

f

0 ≤ F lowi,ii − f lowt,i,ii ⊥ σt,i,ii ≥ 0

∀t, i, ii

0 ≤ ψt,i − ψt,ii + σt,i,ii − σt,ii,i ⊥ f lowt,i,ii ≥ 0

(48)

∀t, i, ii

(49)

The complementarity condition associated to the emission market’s problem is as follows:
X
0≤E−
ep · ((gt,f,p,i + gnt,f,p,i ) · τt ) ⊥ ϕ ≥ 0
(50)
t,f,p,i

3

Perfect competition model

We modify the model presented in Section 2 by assuming that generators operate in a perfectly
competitive way. Under this assumption, generators are price takers and sell electricity at the
zonal price pt,i defined by the market. This implies a slight modification of their objective
function that becomes as reported in (51) below. The price pt,i is now the dual variable of the
market clearing condition in the Market Operator’s problem (see (52)).
All the remaining constraints are as in Section 2.


X

X
Max
pt,i · st,f,i −
vcf,p,i · (gt,f,p,i + gnt,f,p,i ) · τt +
(51)


t,i

p,i





X
X
+ ϕ · [GEf −
ep · (gt,f,p,i + gnt,f,p,i )] −
shcf,sh,i · sht,f,sh,i · τt +


t,p,i

i,t

−

X

f cf,p,i · If,p,i · τ

p,i

X
f

st,f,i −

X
(f lowt,i,ii − f lowt,ii,i ) − dt,i = 0

(pt,i )

∀t, i

(52)

ii

The complementarity conditions of the perfectly competitive market are the same of those
of the Cournot model except for conditions (29), (46) and (47) that respectively become:
0 ≤ −pt,i + αt,i ⊥ st,f,i ≥ 0

∀t, f, p, i

(53)
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0 ≤ −at,i + bt,i · dt,i + pt,i ⊥ dt,i ≥ 0
X

st,f,i −

f

4
4.1

X
(f lowt,i,ii − f lowt,ii,i ) − dt,i = 0

∀t, i
(pt,i )

(54)
∀t, i

(55)

ii

Application to the Italian electricity market
Market description

We apply our models to a prototype of the Italian electricity market as depicted on Figure
1. This market is discretized into six geographical zones (North, Center-North, Center-South,
South, Sicily, Sardinia) and five virtual poles (Monfalcone, Foggia, Brindisi, Rossano, Priolo)
with limited production for a total of eleven zones. Our analysis is calibrated with 2009 data.

Figure 1: Italian Network
Following the network representation provided by Terna, the Italian Transmission System
Operator (TSO), we assume that each zone is connected to the others by two connections with
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different limited transfer capacities that depend on the flow directions. The transfer limits are
listed in Table 16 and are used to define the parameter F lowi,ii in condition (19).
MW

N

CN

CS

S

Sic

Sar

Mf

Fg

Br

Rs

Pl

N
CN
CS
S
Sic
Sar
Mf
Fg
Br
Rs
Pl

0
1700
0
0
0
0
1030
0
0
0
0

3450
0
2250
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
1750
0
3700
0
450
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
10000
0
0
0
0
1200
5200
1613
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
150
315

0
0
420
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

10000
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
10000
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
10000
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
10000
275
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
10000
0
0
0
0
0
0

Table 1: F lowi,ii
A set of eight generators7 produce electricity running wind, run-on-river (hydro), geothermal,
photovoltaic, coal, CCGT, other gas and oil based power plants depending on their availability.
Capacity data for all these technologies are taken from the annual reports of the considered
power companies and from Terna8 . Electricity is generated by existing and new power plants.
In order to simplify both the database and the interpretation of the results, we assume that
old and new capacity have identical variable costs. The models obviously allow one to change
this assumption to apply different efficiency rates to new plants. Doing so in this prototype
study would however mix fundamental economic phenomena and sometimes arbitrary data
differentiations and hence cloud the interpretation of the results.
The time horizon of the model is divided into segments corresponding to the twenty-four
hours of a day. We model electricity demand by using an affine inverse demand function depending on time and zones. Demand function is constructed taking an elasticity of 0.1 for all
consumers; reference demand and price are taken from the Italian Market Operator website9 .
We develop and analyze a variety of scenarios in the framework of the two market forms previously analyzed. These scenarios allow us to evaluate the impact of the EU-ETS on electricity
prices, investments and generators’ profits in the different scenarios.
Scenarios are subdivided into two groups: in the first one we describe the situation of the
Italian electricity market in 2009 (see Table 2), while in the other we provide an outlook of the
2020’s situation (see Table 3) in order to study the new setting of the third EU-ETS phase. In
6

See Terna, (2011).
Valori dei limiti di transito tra le zone di mercato REV.14, Available at http://www.terna.it/default/Home/SISTEMA_ELETTRICO/mercato_elettrico/Procedura_valutazione_
limiti_e_limiti_transito.aspx
7
The considered companies are: Enel, Edison, Eni, Edipower, Eon, A2A, TirrenoPower, in addition to a fringe
that collects all the remaining small power companies.
8
See http://www.terna.it/default/Home/SISTEMA_ELETTRICO/statistiche/dati_statistici.aspx
9
See Gestore Mercato Elettrico (GME) website at http://www.mercatoelettrico.org/En/download/
DownloadDati.aspx?val=MGP_PrezziConvenzionali
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all these scenarios, we assume that generators operate under the EU-ETS regime and always
invest in new capacity.
Among the 2009 scenarios, we describe the setting of the current EU-ETS phase without
(“ETS”) and with (“ETS, inc”) incentives in new renewable power plants. We apply these tests
both to the “Cournot” and “Perfect” competition market organizations.
Scenario 2009

Description

Cournot, ETS
Cournot, ETS, inc

Oligopolistic competition with ETS regulation and investments
Oligopolistic competition with ETS regulation, investments
and incentives in new renewable technologies

Perfect, ETS
Perfect, ETS, inc

Perfect competition with ETS regulation and investments
Perfect competition with ETS regulation, investments
and incentives in new renewable technologies

Table 2: 2009 scenarios
For the 2020’s prevision, we study scenarios with and without (“nodev”) economic development. For both of them, we also consider the cases with and without incentives in renewables.
To model economic development in 2020, we increase the 2009 reference electricity demand and
prices by 22,4% and 14% respectively, while these increases are only of 14.3% and 11% in case
of economic stagnation10 .
Scenario 2020
Cournot, ETS
Cournot, ETS, inc
Cournot, ETS, nodev
Cournot, ETS, inc, nodev

Perfect, ETS
Perfect, ETS, inc
Perfect, ETS, nodev
Perfect, ETS, inc, nodev

Description
Oligopolistic competition with ETS regulation and investments
Oligopolistic competition with ETS regulation, investments
and incentives in new renewable technologies
Oligopolistic competition with ETS regulation and investments
in the case of no economic development
Oligopolistic competition with ETS regulation, investments
incentives in new renewable technologies in the case of no
economic development
Perfect competition with ETS regulation and investments
Perfect competition with ETS regulation, investments
and incentives in new renewable technologies
Perfect competition with ETS regulation and investments
in the case of no economic development
Oligopolistic competition with ETS regulation, investments and
incentives in new renewable technologies in the case of no
economic development

Table 3: 2020 scenarios
The emission market that we model is limited to the Italian electricity market and we do not
consider the CO2 allowance trade with the other sectors involved in the EU-ETS. We introduce
10

See Terna, 2006 and ICCF, 2005.
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this restriction since we do no have any information about this trade, but we intend to overcome
this limit in our future research. Given this restriction, the total emission cap E computed for
the 2009 scenarios corresponds exactly to the sum of the NAPs of the electricity generating
companies included in the simulation tests that we took from the European Commission website11 . It amounts to about 94 Millions tons. This cap denotes the amount of emissions allowed
in the power market. Considering the new disposal introduced by Directive 2009/29/EC, we
compute the 2020 cap by reducing by 15% the 2009 cap12 .
Finally, our mixed complementarity problems are implemented in GAMS language using
PATH as solver.

4.2

Results

In this section, we report the results of our analysis. In particular, we want to show the effects of
the EU-ETS on electricity prices, investments and generators’ profits in the different scenarios.

4.2.1

Impact on prices

Figures 2 and 3 define the trend of the national hourly electricity prices respectively in 2009
and 2020. For 2009, we consider all scenarios listed in Table 2, while for 2020, we select only
four among the six cases proposed in Tables 3.

Figure 2: Average national electricity prices in 2009
Both in Figures 2 and 3, electricity prices are higher in the oligopolistic market organization
than in perfect competition. The electricity prices are generally lower in presence of incentives in
11
12

See http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/allocation/index_en.htm
The 15% cut corresponds to a yearly reduction of 1,74% of the 2009 cap as foreseen by the new ETS Directive.
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renewables. This happens both in 2009 (see Figure 2) and 202013 . In fact, with incentives, there
are more investments in less pollutant plants that imply a reduction of the CO2 allowance price.
This is particularly evident in the “Perfect, ETS, inc” of the 2009 setting, where the emission
price decreases by 41% compared to its corresponding level without incentives (“Perfect, ETS”).
This lower electricity price also implies a daily increase of about 102 GW in electricity demand
compared to the “Perfect, ETS” value. We register the same phenomenon in the 2009 “Cournot,
ETS, inc” case, but in a smaller proportion because the CO2 price decreases only by 23.5% and
the raise of the daily power consumption is just of 9 GW.

Figure 3: Average national electricity prices in 2020
Figure 3 depicts the electricity prices in 2020 in the case with and without economic development for both market organizations. The results confirm that power prices in 2020 are
higher than in 2009. Since the difference between the total quantity of electricity produced
in the cases of economic growth and stagnation is small, we obtain similar electricity prices
in these two cases. This happens both in the Cournot and in the perfect competition market
organizations14 .

4.2.2

Impact on investments

In this section, we describe how the market organization (Cournot vs perfect competition) and
the EU-ETS can affect investment strategies. In our simulations, we assume that generators
13

We do not report this case in Figure 3.
In the “Perfect, ETS, nodev” electricity generation is only 7% lower than in the “Perfect, ETS”. We have an
identical reduction in the “Cournot, ETS, nodev” compared to “Cournot, ETS”.
14
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can only invest in the geographical zones15 (namely North, Center-North, Center-South, South,
Sicily and Sardinia). In Figure 4, we report the results of the 2009 scenarios “ETS”, “ETS,

Figure 4: Zonal investment in 2009 by source of energy (MW)
inc” in the “Cournot and “Perfect” competition cases. A first result is that perfect competition
enhances investments compared to the situation where generators are Cournot players. This
happens both in the scenarios with and without incentives. Under the assumption of perfect
competition, Figure 4 shows that generators take different investment decisions depending on
the zones. In the North, there is a massive investment in wind in addition to other-gas based
plants, while in the other zones power producers only invest in CCGT. These investment choices
can be explained by the fact that, considering our input data, the North disposes of almost the
57% of the Italian available CCGT. This is an efficient technology both in terms of production
and emission generation and it is not subject to intermittence problems (like wind). On the
other hand, wind is the cheapest among the renewable technologies in terms of fixed costs,
but it remains much more expensive compared to the other power units. Even in presence of
incentives (“Perfect ETS, inc”) investment strategies do not change. The incentives increase the
wind investments in the North by 35%. Note that, besides these investments, generators use
existing plants to produce electricity. In particular, both with and without incentives, they run
all renewables16 and CCGT technologies. While renewables are run at full capacity in almost
all hours, existing CCGT is mainly used in the central hours (from 10 a.m to 5 p.m.).
When considering the Cournot scenarios in 2009 (see Figure 4), the investment choices are
all oriented towards CCGT. With incentives in renewables, the investment mix changes and
includes wind, CCGT and also a proportion of coal. Under Cournot assumptions, generators
are able to impose higher electricity price and reduce their production and investment levels. In
15

Note that we assume no investments in hydro plants since the hydroelectric resources are almost fully exploited
in Italy.
16
Wind, hydro, photovoltaic, geothermic.
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this way, the emission constraint is still binding but the associated CO2 is much lower than in
all other 2009 considered scenarios17 . This cut in emission price is due to the increased use of
wind. On the other side, this situation makes coal plants competitive since they are relatively
cheap both in terms of fixed and variable (fuel) costs.

Figure 5: Zonal investment in 2020 by source of energy (MW)
In 2020, the overall investment level is higher than in 2009 both under the Cournot and
the perfect competition assumptions. In Figure 5, we report the results of the 2020 scenarios
in the case with and without economic development. Under perfect competition, generators’
investment strategies remain almost unchanged at zonal level with respect to the 2009 situation
(compare the scenarios reported in Figure 5 with the “Perfect, ETS” case in Figure 4). This is
particularly true in the scenario of low economic growth (see “Perfect, ETS, nodev” in Figure 5)
where in the North there are still investments in other-gas power plants (even though in a lower
proportion compared to the 2009 case18 ). Recall again that due to the high concentration of
CCGT plants in the North, generators prefer to invest in another type of fossil-fired technology,
at least in this area, but in the other zones, they continue to invest in CCGT. These investments
in other-gas plants disappear in presence of economic development. In fact, generators only build
new wind stations. With incentives in renewables (these cases are not reported in Figure 5),
It amounts to 39 e/MWh, while in the corresponding Cournot case without incentives allowance price is 51
e/MWh. Under perfect competition, CO2 emission prices amount to 207 e/MWh and 112 e/MWh respectively
in the cases without and with incentives. We know that these prices are not realistic, but they can be compatible
with our model assumptions. In fact, we assume that the emission market involves the electricity market only and
experience has shown that the power market has been always short in emission permits. This becomes particularly
true in the case of the Italian electricity market because its production is mainly based on fossil-fired power plants.
In fact, we have observed that an increase of the emission cap determines a decrease of the CO2 allowance price.
18
In 2009, investments in other-gas plants amount to 42% and 30% of the total investment level in the North
respectively in the case without and with incentives. In 2020, this proportion drops to 9%.
17
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investments increase both in the scenarios with and without economic development. In the
North, only new wind plants appear, while in the other zones investments in CCGT persist.
Considering now the Cournot scenarios in Figure 5 and comparing them with the case
“Cournot, ETS” in Figure 4, one can see that generators reduce their global investments in
CCGT in favor of wind in all zones. This is particularly evident in the North. This change
of tendency can be considered as a direct effect of the compulsory auctioning system imposed
by Directive 2009/29/EC on energy sector during the third EU-ETS phase. Since the aim of
oligopolistic generators is to maximize their profits, they try to reduce their emission costs by
investing in renewables. This happens both with and without economic developments.
In presence of incentives in renewables19 , investments in wind almost double in the “Cournot,
ETS, inc” and triple in the “Cournot, ETS, inc, nodev” with respect to the corresponding cases
without incentives (see Figure 5). However, incentives induce generators to build new coal plant
both with and without economic development. The reasoning, illustrated for the 2009 scenarios
with incentives, also holds for these 2020 cases.

4.2.3

Impact on generators’ profits

Tables 4 and 5 respectively report the profit analysis in the 2009 and 2020 scenarios. In particular, they list the “Generation Revenues”, the “Generation Costs”, the “Emission Revenues”
and the “Emission Costs”. The first two terms indicate the profits and the (fixed and variable)
costs related to power production from new and existing plants, while the difference between
the other two shows the emission opportunity costs. In 2020, the column “Emission Revenues”
disappears since during the third EU-ETS phase the power sector will buy all needed permits.
Note that, in our analysis, we do not consider the windfall profits problem that has been extensively discussed and proved in literature (see Chen et al., 2008, Kara et al., 2008, Linares et al.,
2008, Lise et al., 2010, Sijm et al., 2006). Moreover, in our simulations we assume full auctioning
of CO2 allowances both in 2009 and 2020. The “Emission Revenues” in 2009 are simply given
by the product between the endogenous allowance price and the grandfathered permits.
As expected, the generators’ profits in an oligopolistic market are always higher than in
perfect competition. This happens both in 2009 and 2020 scenarios, but it is particularly
evident in 2020 when generators no longer receive permits for free. The comparison between
the results in Tables 4 and 5 shows that the profits of oligopolistic (“Cournot”) generators are
higher in 2020 than in 2009. This is a direct consequence of the increase of the electricity prices
that more than compensates the cost of emissions.
In the perfect competition cases, profits are lower in 2009 than in 2020 because they have
to buy all needed permits.
In all scenarios, generators gain lower profits when receiving incentives on renewables because
the subsidies to these technologies lead to lower electricity prices while maintaining relatively
high investment costs. Finally, in the 2020 case with no economic developments, generators’
profits are lower than in the corresponding cases with economic growth.
19

Again, results are not reported in Figure 5.
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Scenarios

Generation
Revenues
(Me)

Generation
Costs
(Me)

Emission
Revenues
(Me)

Emission
Costs
(Me)

Total
Profits
(Me)

Cournot, ETS
Cournot, ETS, inc

40,010
38,997

10,615
10,779

4,317
3,268

4,797
3,631

28,915
27,854

Perfect, ETS
Perfect, ETS, inc

38,366
25,293

11,149
10,144

17,387
9,405

19,319
10,450

25,284
14,104

Table 4: Generators’ profits in 2009 scenarios
Scenarios

Cournot,
Cournot,
Cournot,
Cournot,
Perfect,
Perfect,
Perfect,
Perfect,

ETS
ETS, inc
ETS, nodev
ETS, inc, nodev

ETS
ETS, inc
ETS, nodev
ETS, inc, nodev

Generation
Revenues
(Me)

Generation
Costs
(Me)

Emission
Costs
(Me)

Total
Profits
(Me)

62,817
53,665
57,306
49,156

21,698
17,920
19,044
16,156

8,086
2,578
7,720
2,578

33,034
33,166
30,542
30,417

52,076
36,162
47,084
27,081

24,231
17,761
20,790
13,864

19,583
13,169
18,211
9,068

8,262
5,231
8,083
4,149

Table 5: Generators’ profits in 2020 scenarios

5

Conclusion

The generation expansion models presented in Section 2 and Section 3 simulate and analyze the
impact of the EU-ETS on the Italian electricity market. In particular, these models are used
to measure the effects of the EU-ETS Directives on electricity prices and demand, investments
and generators’ profits both in an oligopolistic and in a perfectly competitive organization of
the power market. For this reason, we consider several investment scenarios under the CO2
regulation with and without incentives to renewables. The scenarios also include simulations on
future effects of the third EU-ETS phase on the system.
Our analysis shows that perfect competition induces generators to invest more than in an
oligopolistic framework, but in both market configurations, investments are mainly concentrated
in fossil-fired plants (CCGT and coal), leaving a small proportion to new wind plants. This
happens also in presence of incentives given to renewable technologies. We can thus conclude
that investments in a secure and efficient technology like CCGT is preferable compared to
those in renewables that cannot be used with continuity. The absence of nuclear plants in the
Italian power market also influences the choice described above. This investment policy affects
electricity prices that significantly increase in 2020 compared to their 2009 levels.
The raise of electricity prices in 2020 is particularly favorable for generators operating as
Cournot players which are able to increase their profits compared to 2009, despite the full
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auctioning system foreseen for the allocation of CO2 allowance to the power sector in the third
EU-ETS phase. On the contrary, in a perfect competition organization, generators face a
significant drop in their 2020 profits compared to 2009 caused by the increase of their emission
costs.
In our future research, we intend to develop the current model by including a technological
representation of industrial sectors covered by the EU-ETS. This will allow us to have a complete
and more realistic representation of the emission market functioning.
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